Standing Committee B

[Mr. Roger Galein the Chair]

Clause 10

Power to order breach etc to be remedied

Ian Stewart: I beg to move amendment No. 138, in page 7, line 20, at end insert
(1A) A court may in making an order under subsection (1) impose on the organisation an order (a Corporate Probation Order) requiring it to take one or more of the following steps
(a) make restitution to a person for any loss or damage that they suffered as a result of the offence;
(b) establish policies, standards and procedures to reduce the likelihood of the organisation committing a subsequent offence;
(c) communicate policies, standards and procedures established under subsection (1A)(b) to its representatives, employees and shareholders;
(d) report to the Court on the implementation of policies, standards and procedures established under subsection (1A)(b);
(e) identify the senior officer who is responsible for compliance with policies, standards and procedures established under subsection (1A)(b);
(f) provide in the manner specified by the court the following information to the public, and require the same to be recorded against the names ofthe directors of the company in the register at Companies House, namely
(i) the offence of which the organisation was convicted;
(ii) the sentence imposed by the Court; and
(iii) any measures that the organisation is takingincluding policies, standards and procedures established under subsection (1A)(b)to reduce the likelihood of it committing a subsequent offence;
(g) comply with any reasonable conditions that the Court considers necessary to prevent the organisation from committing subsequent offences or to remedy the harm caused by the offences.
(1B) The Court shall, if it considers it appropriate, appoint another person or body to supervise the implementation of a Corporate Probation Order..
Good morning, Mr. Gale. I understand the limitations of the Bill, but I intend to prod and poke the Minister to see if he can create some option doorways that we can sensibly go through both before and after the Committee stage.
I have a trade union background. All members of the Committee bring experience of our personal background to our debates. I joined my trade union, the Transport and General Workers Union, at the age of 15, on my first day of work. I have been a shop steward, a union health and safety rep and a full-time officer for 20 years. It is only right to say that the present Government are the first Government ever to have said that trade unions are a force for good. We should keep that in mind throughout the debateon amendment No. 138. The act of trade unions working in partnership with good employers has a democratising effect that is often hidden in a developed economy such as ours.
However, our backgrounds and formative experiences, important as they are, should inform our role as legislators not control it. Learned members of this Committee from the legal profession bring, among other things, the experience of interpreting law, acting as advocates and seeking remedies. Other members of the Committee have a trade union background and have been practitioners used to advising, representing, training and campaigning with workers to prevent accidents from happening at work. Trade unionsare a source of free legal advice and represent about7 million trade union members in the United Kingdom; in my view, that has always been one of the good reasons for joining a union. Both traditions, and others, have a role to play, but we are in Committee as legislators and our role is to make good law that is reasoned and appropriatelaw that will be effective in acting as a deterrent and give the courts the tools to take the appropriate action through a spectrum of sanctions, penalties and remedies. In the wider sense, we must ensure that we make provision so that justice can be done and be seen to have been done.
Through amendment No. 138, we want to establish a duty for directors or other persons that would put the law on corporate manslaughter on a par with other legislation that affects the working environment. We want to give the courts the tools to improve remedial action to right a breach, and to set up a framework by which better corporate responsibility can be assured. Most importantly, we want to examine dispassionately the mechanisms and frameworks by which justice can be done. We must have regard to and ensure that there is public acceptance that we, as law makers, have not by our omissions left the courts with the concept of corporate manslaughter, but without the tools to enforce reasoned and appropriate penalties for the most serious breaches. We must consider fully whether there is any way in which we can identify a corporation that is responsible and a corporate representative dutythat is, identify who is responsible for the companys acts or omissions. Otherwise, we may all fail in our responsibilities.
Clause 10 refers to remedial orders and the amendment refers to remedial and corporate probation orders for gross breach. Clause 10(1) states:
A court before which an organisation is convicted of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide may order it to take specified steps to remedy
(a) the breach mentioned in section 1(1);
(b) any matter that appears to the court to have resulted from that breach and to have been a cause of the death.
The amendment is designed to allow the remedy of restitution, to make clear what the court thinks ought to happen and to recognise that the current system of compensation alone is inadequate. The second part of the amendment refers to a court having the power to impose a corporate probation order, requiring the company to take certain steps.
At this point, let me outline the Governments current view, make a short statement on my understanding of directors duties and perhaps say a wee bit more about some of the proposed principles to be observed by the Macrory commission. My understanding of the current view is that although the UK has a strong health and safety record, there were 212 fatal injuries at work in 2004-05, and the law must provide a proper framework for holding companies and other organisations to account when management failings lie behind such deaths. Under current law, for a company to be prosecuted, the prosecution must first prove that a single person senior enough to embody the companysomeone at the top of the organisationis personally guilty of gross negligence. The Bill will introduce a criminal offence enabling juries to consider the overall picture of how an organisations activities were managed or organised, rather than focus on the actions of one individual. Prosecution for the offence will be reserved for the worst cases of mismanagement leading to death. I press the Government to reconsider whether that is enough. I again acknowledge the Bills limitations, but, as I said, the Minister might be able to open some doorways for a future stage of the Bill or beyond.
In the Bill, the Government have identified the concept of corporate manslaughter and of taking some sort of remedial action, through compensation and other provisions, that will allow companies to carry on and, hopefully, not to do again what they have done. My own view and that of my hon. Friends is that that is not enough.

Jim McGovern: I think that everyone accepts the legitimacy of a fine as a punishment, but perhaps it is not a sufficient deterrent in such situations. Does my hon. Friend agree that a smaller fine but a stronger focus on rectifying the breach might be a more appropriate sanction?

Ian Stewart: I can see the rationale behind my hon. Friends statement, but I am not sure that I fully accept his point, because I think that the whole spectrum of sanctions should be available to courts, including smaller fines and more remedial action, as he suggests. However, I believe that it should go further to include a specified duty on an identified person and that the court should have the right, as it does under other legislation, to consider custodial sentences

Roger Gale: Order. I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman and I know precisely where he is coming from, but he is in grave danger of being out of order. The long title of the Bill, as he well knows, does not embrace individual responsibility. I have tried to give him some leeway, but he might find a little bit more if and when we reach clause 17. For the moment, however, I have to ask him to return to the amendment under discussion.

Ian Stewart: I accept that, Mr. Gale, but I seek further guidance, which I am sure you will give me in the proper spirit. I could have raised a point of order, because this has been a complex process. We have sought to table amendments to get behind the Governments thinking and perhaps even influence it, but we have encountered difficulties with the Public Bills Officealthough the Clerks have been helpful. Some of our amendments had been accepted, but then that acceptance was withdrawn. That is not a matter for today, but I give notice that I intend to take that up, at least informally, after proceedings on the Bill have concluded. I beg your indulgence, Mr. Gale, because I have been coming at things from that point of view.

Roger Gale: I understand the hon. Gentlemans dilemma, but the long title of the Bill is absolutely clear and its definition does not embrace individual responsibility. The hon. Gentleman will have to use other means and other powers of persuasion outside this room if he wishes to go down that road with Ministers or the Government generally. For the moment I am afraid that I cannot give him the leeway that he wants, much though I might wish to do so. He has to come back to the amendment under discussion.

Ian Stewart: I shall return to amendment No. 138, Mr. Gale, but I should like to outline some of the background before dealing with its relevant parts.
Although I mentioned earlier that we should consider this matter dispassionately, a few instructive cases will help us understand the clause and the amendment to it. The GMB union has done some good, groundbreaking work on health and safety issues and on violence at work, which is a related subject. Notwithstanding that work, four GMB members were thrown from a gantry moving under a bridge while they were carrying out repair work. There was no end stop on the rail and the gantry came off the rail and threw the men to their deaths. The companies involved were Yarm Road, formerly Kvaerner Cleveland Bridge Ltd, and Costain Ltd. A similar accident had happened some six months earlier, but without loss of life or injury. However, no action was taken to prevent it from happening again and the repeat accident ended in the deaths of four workers. The outcome of that was a verdict of unlawful killing. The companies were fined £500,000 between them for the breaches of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. It is likely that the companies would have been successfully prosecuted under the Bill; however, the courts will not be able to consider anything outside the sanctions in the Bill.
Despite the restrictions you have placed on my line of argument, Mr. Gale, I should just like to mention the case of the Whelan family, from whom I have received a letter that I should like to quotenot to express my personal view, but to show the feeling abroad outside the House and our world. With your permission, I shall quote Mrs. Whelan, who writes:
I want to tell you how my son Craig died to show you the risks workers face and the injustice families face when someone is killed at work.
My son Craig worked for a company called Churchills Ltd. in Nottingham, which won a tender to demolish a chimney at Metal Box in Bolton on the basis of cost and not safety. His company offered to do it for £8,000. But other local companies, who had worked on the chimney in the past, were aware of the contents and the dangers of using hot cutting gear. They would only carry out the work using cold cutting gear and taking the chimney down from the outside. Because of the amount of equipment needed their prices for the job were between £20,000 and £30,000.
Having explained what happened in the court case, Mrs. Whelan states:
The company representatives then pleaded guilty to a lesser offence of breaching health and safety legislation...On Wednesday 12th June 2004 the three men...were convicted under the Health and Safety at Work Act on all counts, which they had originally been charged with, for manslaughter.
Mrs. Whelan goes on to say that two were fined £7,500 each and the other £2,000. She continues:
Because the manslaughter charges were dropped, no costs were awarded against the three men.
They pleaded guilty to knowing the contents of the chimney were unsafe and failing to pass the information on regarding the e-mail they received to either the company, Craig or Paul and to sending the two men back into the chimney and therefore to their deaths.
The final part indicates the mind of parents who have gone through this experience. Mrs. Whelan concludes:
In their last statement they said that they had not had sufficient training in Health and Safety. I ask: what training could these men be given that would have helped them to pass on the information stating, WARNING, the contents of the chimney are flammable and toxic?
In all cases of death by industrial incident, individual directors should be prosecuted.
During our exchanges in Committee, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has consistently argued that he is not in favour of sending people to prison for negligence. What has been going through my mind during our exchanges is that, in relation to the Bill, we are not talking about negligence but about exceptional cases of gross negligence. It is a matter not of whether there was an accident, but of whether it was proven at court that there had been wilful, gross negligence.

Dominic Grieve: At the risk of repeating myself, if there is gross negligence and evidence of individual acts of gross negligence, I am in favour of prosecuting somebody for manslaughter under the existing law. There is a big difference between gross negligence and negligence. I do not object to people being imprisoned if they commit acts of gross negligence but the law is already there to deal with that.

Ian Stewart: I did hear and I did understand the hon. Gentleman in the previous exchanges, but neither Mrs. Whelan nor I accept his opinion. Within the restrictions and limitations of the Bill, amendmentNo. 138 would establish the checks and balances and enable a signal to be sent to employers who are prepared to commit gross negligencequite wilfully, Mrs. Whelans letter shows. The provision would restrict them from acting like that. It would act as a deterrent to companies in the same way that financial, environmental and food-processing laws do. We seek both equity within the law and the deterrence effect.
Through the proposed corporate probation orders, we want adequate action to be taken to raise awareness through training and so on to ensure that a company becomes safe before accidents happen. We hope that through the ability to require reports to the court
on the implementation of policies, standards and procedures established under subsection (1A)(b),
employers found guilty would be expected to comply thereafter and report to the court at regular intervals during probation. We are hoping that a senior person would be identified as responsible for compliance with those policies, standards and procedures.
One question has eluded us in relation to the concept of corporate manslaughter: we are offering the concept to the courts but not offering them the ability to identify who is responsible. At the start of our consideration of the Bill, the Minister said that we are concerned with the how, not the who, but I say that we are concerned with both the how and the who, and I would welcome an amendment that would move toward something of that nature, because it would strengthen the Bills provisions on corporate probation. The other question that arises from identification of senior officers in proposed new paragraph (e) is who takes charge on behalf of the company.
Whenever a company is convicted of a serious breach, it should have a responsibility to report that breach to the shareholders. Opposition Members have sometimes toyed with the idea of naming and shaming, and I agree with them in that it would send a powerful signal to shareholders both that a breach would impinge on profitability and, more significantly, that peoples health and safety are more important than profitability in itself.

Michael Fabricant: I am interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying about naming and shaming. Perhaps I am wrong, but I was under the impression that if one is found guilty of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide under the Bill then, apart from it being reported in the press, one would also have to report it in the annual accounts. When the Minister replies will he make that clear?

Ian Stewart: I do not wish to be presumptuous and answer on the Ministers behalf, but my understanding is that the answer to the hon. Gentlemans question is no. I can see that the Minister is getting good advice from hon. Members on both sides of the Committee, and it is all free, but I press him to go further in future and to consider sanctions against companies that have been found guilty, so that they would not be able to apply for any public money. I accept that there is a fine balance to be struck between ensuring that a company is allowed to stay in business if an incident falls short of death, while at the same time finding it guilty and applying a remedy, but further consideration could be given to the implications of being found guilty.
The key to the rest of the amendment is how, within the limitations of the Bill, to stop employers being put in a position where they have to take a chance in order to save money, and have to tip the balance away from their proper responsibilities for the health and well-being of their workers and of the public. In general, the Bill will bring a better situation into being, but it would be better still if the amendment were adopted. So I shall press not you, Mr. Gale, but the Ministerseparately from the Committeeon some of the other concepts that I have attempted to raise to the best of my ability and with your indulgence.
To conclude my remarks on amendment No. 138, proposed new paragraph (g) refers to complying with any reasonable conditions that the court considers desirable to prevent an organisation from committing subsequent offences or to
remedy the harm caused by the offences.
No one could disagree with such a provision. It is the reasoned and appropriate action for a court to take when deciding to right a situation that is wrong. It would give the judge the flexibility to impose other conditions, such as director training. Training, like health and safety, is sometimes, for bad employers, the bit of their work that disappears in the pursuit of staying afloat. I am all for helping employers to remain viable. Business is the life blood of this country and it is what makes our wealth, but I am not in the business of allowing bad employers who play with peoples lives to stay afloat.
The intention behind the amendment is to allow the judge to take action to make the company safe. If a significant fine is the way to do that, I accept it. I return to the earlier comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. McGovern) about an appropriate mix of sanctions. I will press the Minister on Report about directors duties under section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974, but I shall be pleased if he will assist us in our deliberations between now and Report. I want to improve the Bill, but I give the Minister fair warning that the amendment, in itself, is not enough.

Dominic Grieve: I am sympathetic to what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve. There might be some scope for doing more than just imposing a penalty and remedial orders. Indeed, as I have said, I have some doubt about the efficacy of remedial orders or the necessity of having them. I should prefer that clause 10 were altered to reflect, in part at any rate, some of the points that the hon. Gentleman has made.
The best that I can do is to run through the stepsthat the hon. Gentleman has identified in amendment No. 138 and explain why I think that some might be feasible and why others are probably not. Proposed new paragraph (a) states that a court may require an organisation to
make restitution to a person for any loss or damage that they suffered as a result of the offence.
Such a matter is covered under current health and safety at work legislation. Under the ordinary rules of court, it is possible to make a compensation order. However, in reality it is unusual for a compensation order to be made in a health and safety at work case. Judges have said once or twice that they might want to make such an order, but have been told by the parties present, including representatives of the prosecution, that it was probably not a good idea because, witha conviction for corporate manslaughter and a conviction under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act, civil compensation will follow automatically to the victim or the victims family.
The difficulty is that compensation needs to be calculated. Sometimes it has been done by the time the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act case came to court. It is usually powerful mitigation for the defence counsel to say, I wish to tell your Honour that, in this case, compensation has been agreed with the relatives of the deceased person and has already been paid, and that brings the matter to an end. In truth, criminal courts are not well placed to calculate complex compensation claims and, for that reason, they would probably not welcome the power to make a restitution order. In any event, the power to make a compensation order will already lie under the existing law.
Let us consider the establishment of policy standards and procedures, and how to communicate them. That bring me back to last Thursdays debate about to what extent the court will be in a good position under clause 10 to provide for remedial orders to be made at all. As I said then, my view is that the Health and Safety Executive, the local authority or possibly one of the other enforcement agencies will have to spell out what is required.
If the judge is to be asked to do it, he will need advice on what needs to be done, which is one of the reasons why I have some anxiety about the remedial orders. However, that applies equally to what the hon. Member for Eccles (Ian Stewart) has set out in his amendment. Similarly, when we say report to the court, we must be a bit careful. When a court has completed such proceedings, it breaks up. A court can be reconstituted and the judge brought back, but I am not sure that the courts are well placed to deal with a return. Clearly, if a remedial order is breached, the case will presumably have to go back before a judge, or the judge who presides over the case, but the courts are not a monitoring body. Ultimately, that duty will fall again on the enforcement authority.

Ian Stewart: I have approached the matter in the spirit that we all bring expertise from our past histories. If the hon. Gentlemans experience tells us that the court is not appropriate as it is structured, would he comment on whether it could be restructured, or might other regulatory bodies be more appropriate?

Dominic Grieve: From our debate on Thursday when we were considering remedial ordersthe Minister might be able to help us as we develop the ordersI assume that if he wants remedial orders, the courts will have to have some mechanism by which to direct the appropriate enforcement authority to monitor their implementation. If an order is breached, that will be a criminal offence and will have to be brought back before the court on that charge or another charge.
That is already covered in clause 10. To that extent, I am not sure that the amendments proposed new subsections, (1A)(a) to (d), for instance, add very much to what I read to be already in the remedial orders proposed by the Minister. I continue to be anxious about how the measures will be implemented in practice, but he might be able to provide further reassurance today.
Because I do not want to sound too negative, I turn to the more positive aspects of the hon. Gentlemans proposals. I leave the senior officer out of it for the moment to turn to the next page. To what extent can a naming and shaming procedure exist? I am not 100 per cent. sure that he has it right. I am not sure, for instance, to what extent the register at Companies House can be burdened with extraneous detailsthe hon. Gentleman knows that the information in the companies register at Companies House is fairly structuredbut if that could be altered to include a register of any convictions against companies, I for one see no reason why it should not be done.
The danger, of which I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, is that if we start specifying too many things that might be recorded against companies, particularly smaller companies, to their disadvantage at Companies House, a company will just be liquidated and a new company put quickly and cheaply in its place in order to avoid the recording of such information. That is a problem, as lifting the corporate veil to identify the continuity company will be problematic.
That said, requiring larger corporations, perhaps the more reputable ones, to include a record in their annual report to shareholders of any convictions that they have received as a result of their activitiesincluding corporate manslaughter or, for that matter, breaches of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974would be perfectly proper if we could find a way to do so. Some companies already acknowledge prosecutions under the 1974 Act; I have seen it on their annual accounts. Others, I dare say, try to brush it under the carpet. If the Minister feels that something like that could be done, I want to make it quite clear to him that I have no difficulty whatever with that. However, one has to bear in mind the loophole, which smaller companies in particular will exploit, of just shutting down the operation and starting again with a new name. Subject to the Ministers views, it is difficult to see how we would get round that problem.
The register at Companies House is probably not the place to identify measures that an organisation is taking. The annual report to shareholders may be, though private companies do not have to prepare any such report. That is a difficult area and I should be interested to know whether the Minister can assist.

James Brokenshire: Obviously, if companies prepare an annual report and accounts, they are required to file them with Companies House. That may be a method of addressing how to put things on the public record for such companies and provide the disclosure that we have been discussing.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend makes a good point. I was thinking of the register entries, but if one can get access to filed accounts, they could contain the information that a bare register entry may not.

Ian Stewart: I know from a previous life, when I worked with the Minister, that he once had responsibility for such matters. He is aware of the Companies House facility, and he was at pains to impress upon me how well Companies House is developing its service through new technology. I am sure that if the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues, along with us, put our minds to finding solutions, we could be of great assistance to the Minister.

Dominic Grieve: Let me make it clear to the hon. Gentleman that I am no expert on the operation of the Companies Actneither the current one, nor the Companies Bill that is currently going through Parliament; it is not my field of law. I have at times asked for company entries from Companies House when prosecuting, and sometimes there have been quite complex issues on who was the employer under the Act in a prosecution under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act. Some slippery customers tried to say that they were the people doing the undertaking, but that they did not employ anybody, and we would have to ferret away on that. The Minister knows more about it than I, but I am sympathetic to the points made by the hon. Member for Eccles.
I see some practical problems with identifying senior officers responsible for compliance, because the officer may change. Indeed, in some cases the senior officer for compliance at the date of the corporate manslaughter conviction may well not be the officer 24 hours later, if he was there at the time when the accident actually occurred. I also have a slight concern about pillorying individuals. The whole point of the corporate manslaughter conviction is that it is a corporate failurea group failure. There is a risk that it may be unfair if a senior officer is spelt out in a judgment as having an individual responsibility, because it may be his predecessor or other people in the corporate structure who are as much at fault as he is. Subject to that caveat, I reiterate that if there is a way forward on publicly identifying the conviction and recording it, I for one have no objection in principle to that. Publicising the fact that a corporate entity has been convicted may have an effect.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Good morning, Mr. Gale. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Eccles, for Manchester, Central (Tony Lloyd), and for Dundee, West for proposing the amendment. It continues the debate that we had on Thursday afternoon, and in connection with clause 1, on remedial orders. I do not doubt the sincerity and strength of feeling of my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles in moving the amendment. As you pointed out in your effective chairing of the Committee, he strayed a little into individual liability, which I know is his motivation. However, you were quite correct, Mr. Gale, to remind my hon. Friend that this is about corporate manslaughter, which is what has motivated the Government to advance the Bill.

Ian Stewart: The dilemma that I and others face is that a corporation could be described as nothing more than a piece of paper. How can a piece of paper be sent to prison? How does the Minister deal with the issue of who represents the corporation, as in finance and other legal cases?

Gerry Sutcliffe: My hon. Friend tempts me to discuss something that I am sure we will talk about later in relation to clause 17, but I hope he does not mind if I do not get dragged down that route immediately.
I put on the record my condolences and regrets to Mrs. Whelan and her family. All hon. Members share our motivation in trying to resolve this matter. We are trying to find ways to prevent companies from acting as some do. The Governments view is that the corporate elementthrough corporate manslaughteris the missing part of the process. The way that the Committee has addressed this matter, and the way in which it was dealt with on Second Reading, shows our united approach in trying to resolve the climate and culture that exists in a small minority of companies that do not act in the best interests of their employees.
My hon. Friend said in his opening remarks that he was going to prod, provoke and warn me.

Ian Stewart: Oh, I did not say provokeI would never provoke my hon. Friend.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I can assure my hon. Friend that he did provoke me.
It is important that we focus on what we can do about companies. Many interesting ideas were advanced. Amendment No. 138 would give the courts the power to issue probation orders to organisations convicted of the new offence. We discussed that during the debate on clause 1, when I referred to the Macrory review of regulatory penalties, which is due to report in the near future. It would be wrong for me to pre-empt the findings of Professor Macrory, which will in any case apply to a wider range of circumstances than corporate manslaughter. I am prepared to consider corporate probation and the lessons of what went on in Canada, where there have been some useful experiences. There are matters that I should like to consider, in the spirit in which my hon. Friend moved the amendment, and corporate probation is one of them.
My hon. Friend was kind enough to say that I had experience of the matter relating to Companies House. I visited Companies House in Cardiff to see how it is changing from paper to new technology and found that there is a great deal of progression in the way that it is operating. That might be something to consider.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire) spoke about the reports and accounts, which made me think about what was going on in the Department for Trade and Industry at the time and is now part of current legislation. The corporate social responsibility and financial monitoring reports are elements of the process that could contain aspects relevant to companies convicted under the Bill. I am prepared to consider that and see what we can doabout it.
My hon. Friend admitted that many areas of concern relate not to the Bill, but to the 1974 Act. In the spirit that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield mentioned it, I can report that my hon. Friends and I have had a useful meeting with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions to consider what aspects of the 1974 Act could be considered. Although we still favour the corporate manslaughter route, elements of the 1974 Act can be considered. I am happy to pursue those discussions, as I am happy to discuss matters with the Department for Trade and Industry. Matters relating to the new Companies Bill can be looked at.
I hope that the Committee gets the impression that I am trying proactively to consider what can be done about reparation and ensuring that companies know what their position is.
The hon. Member for Lichfield (Michael Fabricant) talked about the requirement relating to company accounts. Convicted companies will be reported by the HSE on its website and the conviction will also be on the police national computer. There will be an opportunity for naming and shaming in addition to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles. We are discussing a difficult issue. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, it may be contentious and might not be appropriate in certain circumstances, but I am willing to consider it and, in that spirit, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw the amendment.

Ian Stewart: I thank my hon. Friend for his response. It has the potential to create opportunity doorways. Before we finish discussing the amendment, I wish to press him further on the limitations of the existing legislation and the sanction of fines. To me, £100,000 sounds like a great deal of money but, as in the Samuel Adams case when a young boy was killed in a major shopping centre, the owners of the centre had billions of pounds. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West said earlier, does my hon. Friend the Minister realise that the scale of the sanction of only fines can pale into insignificance with such serious incidents as death?

Gerry Sutcliffe: I support what my hon. Friend said. We are willing to look at such matters. The Bill refersto unlimited fines and I consider them to be proportionate to how a company operates, its turnover and its assets. My hon. Friend took us down an interesting route when he talked about the company not being able to apply for public funds. I am not sure that I want to go down that particular road becausethe issues are about changing the culture of an organisation and making sure that the penalty meets the crime. However, under the amendment, the reparatory orders and the issue of probation, I am sure that between us we can come up with a solution that meets those requirements. The Bill is about making sure that companies do the right thing.

Jim McGovern: On the subject of identification, does the Minister agree that often it is not so much the organisation that make the changes, but the senior managers? By allowing a judge to identify a specific manager, the clause would reflect more accurately the means by which an organisation could remedy a given situation.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, but the hon. Member for Beaconsfield made the point that senior managers can change and that the difficulty lies in how that is identified. As for the idea of corporate probation, let us consider what happens in Canada where certain positions are identified as being responsible. I shall consider the matter; it is not something that I am saying no to. I shall come back on Report to see what can be done. With that explanation, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.

Ian Stewart: This debate, like the rest of the Committees work, has been interesting. Serious work has been undertaken. It has been not only explorative, but it has tried to identify those opportunity doorways to which I have referred both under the Bill and in other legislation. I am happy that the Minister has given commitments that the matter will be explored further. In the hope that I do not need to come back on Report with advice and amendments to improve the Bill and that we would have concluded matters before then, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Application to police forces

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 143, in page 9, line 12, leave out paragraph (g).
This is a probing amendment. Clause 13(3)(g) refers to
a member of a police force seconded to the Serious Organised Crime Agency or the National Policing Improvement Agency to serve as a member of its staff is to be treated as employed by that Agency.
I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that the Serious Organised Crime Agency would, as an agency, be treated as a public authority for the purposes of the Bill and therefore be subject to the duties placed upon it, subject to clauses 3 and 4?

Ann McKechin: I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify whether special constables in Scotland are covered by this proposal or whether they are already covered in the legislation applicable to Scotland only, which is referred to in the clause, namely the Police (Scotland) Act 1967?

Gerry Sutcliffe: I thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for his probing amendment and the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North (Ann McKechin). Both the Serious Organised Crime Agency and, once it has been established, the National Policing Improvement Agency, can have two categories of people working for them, employees and seconded staff. Police officers who are seconded on a temporary basis should be treated as employees of the agency in question for the purpose of the offence. This is because such secondments can be for a substantial length of time and the organisation, which to all intents and purposes should owe an employers duty, will be that agency.
Although under clause 3(1)(a), an organisation is already covered by the offence in relation to persons other than employees who work for the organisation, clarity is best served by making it explicit that police officers seconded to the agency are treated as their employees. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied that paragraph (g) is necessary and that he will withdraw his amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North is correct that the special constables in Scotland are covered by this Bill.

Dominic Grieve: I am completely satisfied and, with the Committees permission, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Transfer of functions

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 145, in page 10, leave out lines 24 to 26.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 146, in page 10, leave out lines 34 to 36.
No. 147, in page 10, line 37, leave out subsection (5).
No. 148, in clause 19, page 11, line 27, leave out second or and insert and.

Dominic Grieve: Perhaps it is my suspicious nature, but I was puzzled when I read this clause on transfer of functions. I appreciate the need for a transfer of functions, but what slightly puzzled me was that subsection (3)I will read it because one needs to understand the totality of it in order also to understand what the Government are doingstates:
Any proceedings instituted against a relevant public organisation after the transfer for an offence under this Act in respect of the persons death are to be instituted against
(a) the relevant public organisation, if any, by which the functions mentioned in subsection (1) are currently carried out;
(b) if no such organisation currently carries out the functions, the relevant public organisation by which the functions were last carried out.
It then goes onthese are the words that my probing amendment seeks to deleteto state:
The Secretary of State may by order specify a relevant public organisation other than the one mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) as the organisation against which the proceedings are to be instituted.
That is all very well but it gives the Government the power to nominate any organisation that they happen to dream up as the one that ought to be prosecuted, if the Secretary of State so specifies. I do not want to take this to the point of the ludicrous, but the measure is drafted in such a way that if something takes place which is clearly the responsibility of Department A, such as the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State can say that actually the Department that should be prosecuted is the Home Office.
My slightly suspicious nature crept in because one can see that, in circumstance in which a Government Department might have been prosecuted on a coupleof occasions for something, the Minister mightthink it rather more convenient if the arrow of public opprobrium were deflected towards another Department, by order of the Secretary of State, specifying that it is that Department that ought to be prosecuted.
First, given subsections (3)(a) and (b) and (4)(a) and (b), I should like to understand why those subsequent three lines are necessary. Secondly, if they are necessary, why is the scope of the Secretary of States powers so wide? That power is subject to the negative resolution procedure, which is very niceit means there is some possibility for Parliament to intervene and say, Hold on a minute, the Government are trying to conceal what is going on. They are saying that the organisation that ought to be prosecuted is A, whereas everybody else knows that it really ought to be B. That is a step in the right direction. The alternative view, of course, is that something as drastic as the Secretary of State stepping in to specify a completely different organisation as relevant is a matter that should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
I simply throw that idea in for debate. The amendment is a probing one, but the current drafting leaves open the possibility of a Governmentnot necessarily the present one but a subsequent one finding it convenient to order some obscure agency to be liable for prosecution, to spare the blushes of a major Government Department.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I understand why the hon. Gentleman is suspicious. He is right to air his suspicions, but I hope that I shall allay them.
The amendments relate to two different clauses15 and 19. Clause 15 sets out which body is to be prosecuted when functions transfer between or out of Government Departments, or the other bodies listed in schedule 1, or police forces. Prosecutions will be taken against the body that currently has responsibility for the relevant function, but if the function is transferred out of the public sector entirely, proceedings will be against the public body which last carried out the function.
To take a recent example, the Department for Communities and Local Government was established a short time ago; it had a number of functions transferred to it, primarily from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. After the new Department had been established, any prosecution relating to functions transferred to it from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister would be against the new Department. That reflects the reality that when functions transfer, large parts of Departments transfer too.
In some circumstances a different approach maybe warranted. For example, if a function transfers between Government Departments but there is no corresponding transfer of personnel, it may be more appropriate for the Department responsible at the time of the fatality to retain liability. Clause 15 therefore enables an order to be made to vary which body is to be prosecuted. Amendments Nos. 145 to 147 would remove that flexibility, but the Government consider that such flexibility is suitable for the sorts of cases that I mentioned.
Amendment No. 148 relates to clause 19, which sets out how the schedule of Government Departments is to be amended. If a change to the schedule is substantivefor example, if it alters the range of functions to which the offence applieswe propose that the change should be subject to the affirmative procedure. If, however, a change is purely administrativefor example, if it is needed to reflect a restructuring of functions within Governmentthe amendment would be made by negative procedure. It would be onerous to ask both Houses to debate a change in the schedule that merely reflected a change of name of a Government Department, or a shift of functions between an existing Department and anew one.
Amendment No. 148 would limit the use of the negative procedure for deletions from the list. It would apply only if the body on the list were being abolished and all its functions transferred to another Department. We do not think that a huge amount turns on the point. The provision is most likely to be relevant for changes in the machinery of government, when a Government Department is abolished and all its functions are transferred to one or more other Departments. In those cases, subsection (3)(b) enables any newly created Departments to be added to the schedule by the negative procedure. Subsection (3)(c) is intended to mirror that by allowing any Departments being abolished to be removed from the list in a similar fashion.
The present drafting allows a degree of flexibility. It also covers circumstances in which a Department is abolished and its functions are not transferred. We cannot think of any immediate examples, and we think that it would be rare, but a Department might be wound up because the Government was not carrying out a particular activity any more. In those circumstances it would be onerous to require the affirmative procedure to be used. Keeping the Departments name on the list would not affect its abolition. We see little point in requiring Parliament to debate the consequent changes.
As I said, the hon. Gentleman is right to raise his suspicions, but I hope that I have explained our intentions. The provision is not about hiding anything; it is about trying to smooth the flow of Government machinery. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Dominic Grieve: I am most grateful to the Minister. I shall seek leave to withdraw the amendment, but I should just like to say something to him first, because there is a point to be made.
The drafting of the provision is fully justifiedI have no difficulty with that. However, the Secretary of State might exercise his power to specify a relevant public organisation other than the ones covered by clause 15(3)(a) and (b) and (4)(a) and (b), so it is incumbent on him to publicise the reasons for that, otherwise, all Parliament will have is the notice that he has made such an order. If Opposition parties or any hon. Member, decide to pray against the order because they wonder whether there is something about which they should be suspicious, the information regarding such a decision will potentially be unavailable. I hope that the Government will give clear instructions so that the relevant Opposition departmental spokesman will be able to tap into information about why the power has been used. That will save time in the House, because negative resolutions will not be debated.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I shall look into that. I understand how that may occur. I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman about how to deal with it.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

DPPs consent required for proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part ofthe Bill.

Edward Davey: Good morning, Mr. Gale.
There is a serious policy issue to be debated under the clause. The recommendations in the Governments consultation paper in 2000 and in the Law Commissions original proposals were that a private individual could bring a case for the new offence without needing the Director of Public Prosecutions agreement. There has been a change about which there has been a big debate and the Committee should debate it.
I need to be convinced that the Government have got it right. There is a strong case for individuals to be allowed to press ahead with a prosecution without the Government, in the form of the DPP, interfering. The Government and others are concerned that, without the extra hurdle, individuals and bereaved families might bring vexatious private prosecutions without good cause, even though they may not have any real evidence and a prosecution might not be in the public interest. That is unlikely, because such people would presumably get good legal advice. Such cases cost a lot of money and people would not pursue them without being relatively confident that they have a strong case. Denying victims and their bereaved families the possibility of a prosecution by setting up the extra hurdle could be another source of injusticea problem that I thought that the new offence and new structure were designed to address.
Some people have questioned whether the DPP might have a conflict of interests. Hon. Members know that the DPP is an independent person operating under clear rules, like the Crown Prosecution Service, in respect of ensuring that there is sufficient evidence for there to be a chance for a prosecution to succeed and that a prosecution would be in the public interest. Those are the tests. However wonderful a human being any DPP is, if cases are brought against the Crown, the DPP might have political considerations at the back of his or her mind that have the appearance of a conflict of interest.
I am not the only one considering the matter. When they examined the draft Bill, the Joint Committees were very worried about it and recommended that that particular Government proposal should not appear, as did the Law Commission in its original findings.

Ian Stewart: To save me making a speech, I shall put a question to the hon. Gentleman to see whether he agrees with me and my colleagues and so that the Minister can address it when he sums up. Do the hon. Gentleman and the Committee feel that if the clause stands part, it will preclude families bringing private prosecutions? That would be a matter of deep concern to me and my colleagues. Does he feel the same concern?

Edward Davey: Indeed I do. It certainly could preclude individual families bringing prosecutions. Of course, one would imagine that if the DPP felt that there was sufficient evidence and a public interest, he or she might allow the private prosecution anyway. It is not a complete barrier, one hopes.

Gerry Sutcliffe: Perhaps I can help the hon. Gentleman. I do not see the conflict of interest he mentions, but will not such cases be high profile anyway because of the serious nature of corporate manslaughter? It would be difficult for the DPP not to go along with the prosecution. The seriousness of such cases should allay the hon. Gentlemans fears. They are very much in the public eye.

Edward Davey: The Minister is, of course, right that such cases will have a high profile. One might say that the DPP would therefore have political considerations that tended against refusing leave, but that is an argument for not involving the DPP in the process and for allowing individual families to decide whether a private prosecution is appropriate.
The Law Commission said clearly that it is quite a serious matter to remove a bereaved individuals right to bring a private prosecution. That is what the Committee is being asked to do. It is being asked to put the DPP in the way of a bereaved family or community seeking justice. Let us be absolutely clear that what we are being asked to do today is not normal. Therefore, one must ask some searching questions. One would think that having a loved one taken away would be a strong case for being allowed to go ahead, not for having an extra obstacle put in the way.
There is a burden on the Minister to prove his case. I would have thought that the opposite conclusion to the one that reached in the Bill would be the common-sense one. Such cases might be high profile, but it is the individual familys right to pursue justice unfettered by some lawyer, however wonderful that lawyer is. The Committee is being asked to put something in the way of that search for redress. If he can persuade us, we might not vote on the clause today but consider it for Report. We are certainly prepared to consider what he says, but he must make a pretty strong case.

Dominic Grieve: I listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman. To some extent, I share his view that, on the whole, private individuals should be able to bring private prosecutions if they wish. However, we must face up to the reality that a corporate manslaughter charge is likely by its very nature to be a pretty complex piece of litigation. I would think that unless he or she is very wealthya millionairewith a great deal of money to spend on the preparatory work required to support the necessary investigation, it would be difficult for a private individual to mount a prosecution.
Quite apart from anything else, an accident that causes death and is clearly due to a corporate entitys activities will be investigated by the Health and Safety Executive or other enforcement agency first. I hate to think how a private individual bringing a prosecution would be able to manage the necessary co-ordination with the HSE and with the experts who would probably be needed to help, unless the case involved the HSE, which would therefore have to give broad support. I am left with the feeling that at the end of day this debate is slightly academic. I find it hard to see how, in reality, there will ever be a prosecution that is not both backed by the enforcement agencies and brought by the Crown Prosecution Service, with its full panoply of monetary and other resources.

Edward Davey: The hon. Gentleman paints a picture of a helpless individual trying to bring a case by themselves, but he does his former profession a great disservice. I would have thought that in a former life he would have helped that poor person.

Dominic Grieve: I would have endeavoured to help them. In my former professional life I was approached on one or two occasions by individuals who sought advice on whether to bring private prosecutions. On the whole, I tended to be discouraging, although on one occasion I considered bringing a private prosecution against a person who had burgled my house, but whom the police had not seen fit to prosecute. I thought better of it, although I was tempted, because it would have been an easy matter. I would just have had to lay the information before the court, one result of which could have been to shame the CPS into taking the case over, but I was dissuaded from that course of action by a meeting with the chief superintendent at my local police station. There are problems associated with the issue, but the best thing is to listen to the Ministers response.

Ian Stewart: I rise to say that it is gratifying to hear that the hon. Gentleman can change his mind after hearing good argument.

Dominic Grieve: I can be persuaded on many things if cogent argument is applied. To that extent, I remain open to persuasion by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey), but I happen to think that the nature of such prosecutions and the complexity attendant upon them make it not unreasonable to ask for the Director of Public Prosecutions consent. The other reason is that it is undesirable to encourage people to embark on courses of action that are going to lead to hitting the buffers. That applies both waysto the individual and to the corporation at the receiving end of the initial summons bringing it to court. For those reasons, the seriousness of the offence is perhaps of such an order that the DPPs consent is appropriate.
I do not share the hon. Gentlemans view about the DPP being subject to political pressure. Never in my professional experience have I seen a hint of it. The DPP is a civil servant, but once he holds his office he cannot be removed other than for misfeasance or personal misconduct. For those reasons, I do not think that that is a live issue.

Ann McKechin: Will the Minister point out tothe hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton that the reason why Scotland is not mentioned at all in the clause is that case law has established in Scotland that a case of such severity cannot be taken as a private prosecution without the consent of the Crown. I understand that that was a ruling from around 1982 or 1983 in the infamous Carol X case, in which somebody tried to bring a private prosecution for the crime of rape. Private prosecutions are rare in Scots law and one had not been brought for many years until that case was heard. I understand that it was the opinion of the court that the consent of the Crown Office would be required for such a prosecution. Clause 16 would make the law consistent across the whole United Kingdom, which is another argument in favour of the Governments position.
I agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. I have no evidence to suggest that the Crown Office would be under any political pressure in respect of prosecutions. Given the complexities of the cases and the public interest involved in them, it is important that the Crown Office in Scotland or the Director of Public Prosecutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are involved because, as has been pointed out today, the complexities are such that, in practice, their involvement is required.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North. She is right about Scotland, where all proceedings on indictment are instigated by the Lord Advocate. She is right to say that the clause will bring consistency.
I am grateful for the comments of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the independence of the DPP. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton attacked the motivation behind the clause as a barrier to prevent individuals taking private prosecutions. The clause is not about that, but about making sure that the serious offence of corporate manslaughter is dealt with properly. I hope that I shall persuade the him to reflect on what he said. The clause certainly does not rule out private prosecutions; all we are saying is that the DPP should first review the case.
The two factors in gaining the DPPs consent arethe public interest in bringing the case to court and the likelihood of securing a conviction. Given the seriousness of cases in question, there will already be considerable public interest in bringing prosecutions. If there is sufficient evidence to ensure a reasonable prospect of conviction, there would have to be compelling reasons for no prosecution being brought. However, if there were insufficient evidence to support a prosecution, I am not sure what benefit there would be in bringing one.
As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, evidence in corporate manslaughter cases is unlikely to be straightforward. By their nature, such cases involve complex evidence about company structures and industry standards. Private individuals are unlikely to have the same ability as the CPS to assess whether there is sufficient evidence. The families of victims, desperately distressed at having lost their loved ones, are not necessarily going to be able to make that assessment objectively.
In addition, as hon. Members will be aware, the creation of the offence has caused concern among potential defendants that every work-related death will result in a charge of corporate manslaughter and that even the reputations of companies that manage health and safety well, but tragically have a fatal accident, will be damaged through manslaughter charges. Part of our reassurance that only the worst cases of health and safety failures will proceed to court is to ensure that the DPP will be satisfied that in every case the evidence supports a reasonable prospect of conviction.
Bringing cases with no realistic prospect of a conviction to court is in the interests of neither the organisations, whose reputations may unfairly be damaged, nor the families, whose expectations will have been raised unrealistically and who will bear the financial burden of bringing the case. For those reasons, it is right that private prosecutions should require the consent of the DPP. If the DPP does not consent to a prosecution, that decision can be challenged by way of judicial review. With that safeguard in mind, I hope that Committee members will support clause 16.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

No individual liability

Edward Davey: I beg to move amendment No. 151, in page 11, line 4, leave out cannot and insert can.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 152, in page 11, line 6, leave out cannot and insert can.
Clause stand part.
New clause 5Individual liability
(1) An individual can be guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence of corporate manslaughter.
(2) An individual can be guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring, or being art and part in the commission of an offence of corporate homicide.
(3) An individual guilty of an offence under sections 17(1) or (2) shall be liable on conviction on indictment to a fine or a term of imprisonment of up to 14 years..

Edward Davey: Arguably, clause 17 is one of the most controversial in the Bill. It deserves serious debate. On Second Reading and at different points in our proceedings, questions have been asked whether the Bill, which creates the new offences of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide, should include any relationship to individual liability. It has been said that after the Bill is enacted, two methods of prosecuting individuals will remain: under the current offence of individual gross negligence manslaughter or under provisions whereby an individual may be prosecuted as a secondary party to a health and safety at work offence. That is true. The Government like to argue that directors who are guilty of those offences can be taken to court and charged. We are told that the Government consider that that is sufficient and that there is no need to do anything else, but that argument needs to be probed for several reasons.
The act of creating a new offence of corporate manslaughter might result in fewer actions against individual directors who were genuinely at fault. They will not be brought to book because people will go for the corporate offence and will not pursue individuals, because that is more difficult. After all, the whole purpose of creating the third, corporate, offence was because it was so difficult to get prosecutions against individuals. If we allow the clause to stay in the Bill unamended, it might have the perverse result that individual directors who were responsible for tragedies get off. Others share my worry about that.
The argument that if we have any extra individual liability, in addition to the two other offences, we will discourage people from becoming directors and they will become more risk averse does not hold much water because the other two offences remain. Is adding a third offence in respect of individual liability and linking it to the new offence the right way forward? Will it ensure that guilty people who were responsible for someone dying are brought to book? I recognise that such a judgment is difficult. I am not attacking the Government and saying that they have it completely wrong, because I genuinely consider that the arguments are finely balanced. The evidence divided the Joint Committee that examined the draft Bill. Half the members supported the Governments position and the other half were against it. Let us be clear: it is a difficult judgment. In 2000, the Government agreed with the need for a secondary individual liability. I hope that the Minister can explain why they have changed their view.
An interesting piece of evidence heard by the Joint Committee was that surveys of directors showed that a majority of them thought that there should be individual liability. While some business organisations are concerned about such matters and welcome the Governments position, many individual business people consider that, if people are guilty, they should be able to be brought to book.
I wish to say two things to put such a difficult problem in context. We know that individual gross negligence manslaughter is incredibly difficult to prove and to prosecute. The next offence of being secondary party to an offence under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act has not been used much. Research shows that, in the past 20 years, only eight such prosecutions have resulted in a fine or a disqualification. That route does not seem to be used much either. I just wonder whether the provision is needed because the existing offences are not doing the job well enough.
The slightly more emotive argument is that several offences are on the statute book under which directors can be imprisoned for financial misdemeanours, yet the Bill covers situations in which an offence of corporate manslaughter has been shown to have been committed and some managers have been found individually liablenot to the extent of being guilty of individual gross negligence manslaughter, but certainly seriously at fault. If they cannot be dealt with severely, people outside the House will think, Parliament didnt really finish the job. They got so far, but they didnt do what we felt was needed to plug the gaps and ensure that victims and their bereaved families get justice.
I accept that it is a tricky matter, but I hope that the Minister will be able persuade me on to his side, rather than leaving me thinking that we will not be doing our job if we do not strike out clause 17.

Dominic Grieve: As has been quite clear during the course of this debate, I do not support the amendments of the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton seeking to eliminate clause 17. It is axiomatic that if we are to concentrate on corporate manslaughter, a separate offence allowing an individual to be
guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission
of the offence will be a complicating feature. It will complicate the conduct of trials and the representation required, because in order to facilitate corporate manslaughter convictionthis is the point that really exercises mewe will have subtly altered how the Bill interprets the law of manslaughter. I am completely comfortable with aiming at an organisation, but would not be comfortable with criminalising an individual.
The hon. Gentleman must answer this point. If a person has conducted themselves in a manner that he feels should attract criticism, there can be no objection to prosecuting that individual personally for manslaughter, and that is what should happen. If we say that there is a separate offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence of corporate manslaughter, we are in danger of creating a new and separate offence with a different test from that of a straight individual manslaughter conviction. I do not think that those circumstances would have a happy outcome, because it would be immediately pointed out that the tests to establish two very similar offences attracting similar attention and sentencing are different. That is why the Government were absolutely right not to include individual liability in the Bill. It is a simple point, but it is one on which I completely support the Government.

Edward Davey: The hon. Gentleman, in his usual way, is being persuasive, but I ask him this: if it is clear through the proceedings of a trial for corporate manslaughter that an individual or individuals were guilty of
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence of corporate manslaughter,
does he think that they should walk away scot-free?

Dominic Grieve: The position is that in a corporate manslaughter prosecution, evidence might doubtless be adduced suggesting different areas of culpability, by negligence, of individual directors or managers. That is probably inevitable; indeed, it will be part of the prosecutions case. I assume that before the prosecution is brought, the Crown Prosecution Service and the DPP will have considered, as they should in any corporate manslaughter case, whether the facts of the case relating to any individual in the company, be he employee or manager, are of such an order that that person merits being prosecuted personally for manslaughter or gross negligence manslaughter. I can envisage that there might be circumstances in which that happens.
After all, as the hon. Gentleman is aware, the few instances of successful prosecutions for corporate manslaughter under the old law have also involved prosecutions for manslaughter of the individuals concerned. Usually the companies have been very small. The Lyme bay tragedy springs to mind, and there were convictions in that case. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister says, but I should certainly expect that matter to be borne in mind by the DPP and the CPS. We are not abolishing the offence of gross negligence manslaughter against individuals. For that reason, it is important to keep some clarity of distinction between corporate manslaughter and individual manslaughter, and it is neither desirable nor necessary to muddy the waters, because if the CPS were doing its job properly I would expect individual prosecution for manslaughter to be brought if warranted. I hope that the Minister will reassure the Committee on that.

Ian Stewart: We are again brought to the crux of the differencepossibly the most significant differencebetween members of the Committee. The Minister may be able to persuade me about leaving the clause in, because my initial concern was whether the clause would remove the common law offence of aiding and abetting.
This morning I received an e-mail from the motherI do not know her nameof a young man called Mark, who was killed in 2005. He was burnt to death in an explosion at work when a fireball was caused by the crushing of 4,000 aerosol containers filled with butane gas. We can never put ourselves in the position of families who have lost somebody in such circumstances, and I hope that we approach such situations in a dispassionate sense. I shall make my point succinctly.
The mans mother said:
My son was instructed to crush these on a baling machine ... which the general manager admitted to police had a clear warning should never be used to crush enclosed cylinders or anything containing volatile substances as to do so would be dangerous for the operator. My son was never shown this warning nor was he given any training on this machine.
The pertinent point is one that goes to the heart of the resistance from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield to our concerns on the matter. The e-mail continues:
The general manager also told the police that he had carried out a risk assessment in which he said that no aerosols would be accepted for processing for scrap, unless
they were
accompanied by a certificate of degassing and
had
been punctured. On this occasion, he ignored his own risk assessment and accepted the aerosols from a haulier who had no licence to transport hazardous materials. The police told us that they suspected the aerosols were stolen.
In previous arguments that I have put to the Committee I have tried to focus on situations of wilful gross negligence. To date, I have heard no argument that convinces me that there should not be some sanction if there is wilful gross negligence leading to death. That is the thrust behind new clause 5 too. It would leave a pathway for families to seek appropriate redress, so that justice may in their eyes be seen to be done.

Jim McGovern: New clause 5 seeks to make senior managers liable for their actions. Under the Bills original wording, a crime would have been committed only if it had been tied closely to the actions or inactions of a senior manager. The Government have now moved position, and the Bill now provides that a crime is committed if it is substantially under the remit of senior managers, but there is still that unremitting focus on the actions or inactions of senior management. However, the logical extension of that is that such managers are in some way responsible for what has happened. In some cases, the extent to which blame can be laid at the door of a single manager is negligible. In those cases, we would be grateful for a new law that deals with corporate responsibility. However, in others, the blame, while lying within the company, can be firmly laid at the door of one or a small number of managers. Logically, in that type of situation, the managers are as guilty as the company.
We would all agree that there can be a level of culpability among senior management and by definition, certain senior managers. I am sure that many would argue that, despite this, there is very little need to prosecute those people. After all, the corporation will be prosecuted and the family of the person killed will receive justice. Someone has to be held responsible and in this case, it is to be the company. On the contrary, I do not believe that to be the case. If a person can be identified for the death of a loved one, having a fine levied against the organisation which employs that person is not a suitable resolution for the case.

Jeremy Wright: I would have much more sympathy for the hon. Gentlemans case if a mechanism were not already available to prosecute the individual manager in the way that he describes, namely the common law offence, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, of gross negligence manslaughter. Would the hon. Gentleman explain what his proposal and that of his hon. Friend the Member for Eccles would add to the criminal law that is not already there in the common law offence?

Jim McGovern: As I have said, I am not a lawyer. That is not my background, but if an individual is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles has said, grossly negligent, it should be possible to prosecute that person under this Bill. I understand that other means are available, but surely that should be included in this Bill. That is my view. If an individual is responsible for a death, he should be prosecuted.
Clause 17 seems to prevent such common law offences as attempt, conspiracy and aiding and abetting when associated with the primary offence of corporate manslaughter from being pursued. Why must the possibility of other forms of justice be removed on the creation of a new offence? If a person is individually guilty of causing someones death through their negligence or mismanagement, surely they are as liable as the company which let it happen.
My other argument in favour of the amendment is that of prevention and cure. If we could find a way of ensuring that companies pay close attention to health and safety and duty of care matters so that this law was never needed, I for one would be happy. I accept that a fine is a deterrent of sorts, but in large companies, management failures tend to stem from mismanagement that creeps up on them rather than the sort of decision that would be influenced by a large fine. However, the prospect of a prison sentence or some other form of punishment for senior managers would be likely to deter them from acting sloppily, or more likely, spur them on to being better at their jobs.
The prospect of individual prosecution would serve a valuable role in changing behaviour, something that is much needed. My major concern is that senior managers can still act in a way that is reckless and escape punishment. The crime can be punished corporately and yet the same senior managers could be in other senior roles within a short space of time. That does not feel like justice, and with the Labour partys commitment to the victims feelings, it does not seem to tally with the overall approach to criminal justice in which the victim is granted justice and the criminal is fully prosecuted.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful for the way in which hon. Members have debated the amendments and the new clause, which go right to the heart of the debate on individual liability. I stand here as a Home Office Minister. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles talked about his background and mine is similar in that I was a full-time trade union officer in the printing industry, in which deaths were not a common occurrence but unfortunately many took place that should not have, particularly in paper mills with guillotine machinery. I come to the Committee and to the Bill with that history. Therefore, I hope that hon. Members will reflect on why I think that we are heading in the right direction with corporate manslaughter and not individual accountability. The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) was right to point out to my hon. Friend that the existence of health and safety legislation means that gross misconduct can result in a conviction.
Despite that fundamental concern, I want to assist the Committee by addressing three points: the gap in the law that the Bill addresses; any gap in respect of individuals; and the steps beyond the new offence in respect of those individuals.
It will come as no surprise to the Committee to hear me say that the principal purpose of the Bill is to define a new and more effective means of holding organisationsnot individualsto account for manslaughter. The controlling mind test has worked in a small number of prosecutions of small companies, but it fails to reflect the reality of decision making in more complex organisations, where failures in the chain of management can rarely be laid at the door of specific individuals. The Bill seeks to address that problem, which is why it shifts the focus away from individuals, and instead bases liability on gross failures in the management of systems and processes within an organisation. The Bill is therefore about establishing corporate liability for corporate offending.
Having set out a new corporate offence precisely because of the difficulty in identifying a single controlling mind, we see a significant problem with saying that a single person who can take responsibility for the organisations failure can be, and should be, identified. If they are not already responsible under the criminal law for their actions, what would their criminal liability turn on? In our view, it is not enough to move directly from the new Bill to new individual accountability. That needs to start from current individual responsibility. As the law stands, individuals can already be prosecuted for manslaughter where they grossly negligently cause a death. Health and safety law also provides sanctions against individuals whose conduct has contributed to health and safety failures. The new offence does not alter those provisions.
If we want to step beyond that, we need to be clear about the circumstances that are to be covered that are not already covered by criminal offences. There are dangers, in our view, of simply looking to secondary liability for the answer, as new clause 5 or amendments Nos. 151 and 152 suggest. In order to show that an individual aided, abetted, counselled or procured an offence, it would generally be necessary to show that the accessory had a similar state of mind as the main offender, or at least knew or intended that the offence would be committed. In the context of corporate manslaughter, that would mean that an individual would need to be aware of the picture of failing in the organisation, at least contemplate it being grossly negligent and act in a way that supported or sought to bring it about. In those circumstances, however, it is likely that an individual charge of manslaughter would be possible.
The amendments in the group would not achieve any significant extension of individual liability in any event, but they would bring new issues to any trial. As well as assessing individual liability in terms of existing criminal offences, such as manslaughter and offences under health and safety law, the police and prosecution would need to explore any potential differences under the provisions relating to secondary liability. We are not persuaded that that would be a useful exercise.
So if secondary liability is not the answer, how do we address questions about board level responsibility? That is an important issue that goes outside the remit of the Bill, and wider than my Home Office responsibilities, so I tread with care. Director leadership clearly plays a key role in health and safety, and it is reassuring that research by the Health and Safety Executive has found that four out of five organisations provide leadership on health and safety at board level. However, before the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton rises, I acknowledge his point about the remainder that do not do so.
The Health and Safety Commission has been considering how that situation can be improved and recently issued revised guidance to inspectors to encourage them more routinely to press for courts to disqualify directors when they are convicted of health and safety offences. Clearly, that will be effective only where individuals are prosecuted, but ensuring that the full range of sanctions is applied in those cases is a step in the right direction.
The Health and Safety Commission has also been considering whether directors should be under specific statutory duties in relation to health and safety. That is an important issue and raises questions about how best to secure improvements in boards taking active responsibility for health and safety management and in securing their accountability. My hon. Friends the Members for Eccles and for Manchester, Central (Tony Lloyd) have taken that issue up with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, as I have, and we will be discussing it further with the Health and Safety Executive. It is important that the issues are addressed properly and debated, even if the Bill does not directly address them.

Edward Davey: I am sure that the Committee will be pleased to hear that the Minister and his colleagues are taking the matter up with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, because clearly an awful lot could be achieved through the health and safety at work mechanisms. Can he be a little more forthcoming about the timetables or particular issues and, if not, will he assure the Committee that he will either write to members or come back to the matter on Report?

Gerry Sutcliffe: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the spirit in which he suggests that. An initial meeting has taken place and others are planned, but I am not sure whether we can get an outcome before Third Reading and Report. If it is helpful to the Committee, I shall

Ian Stewart: I am conscious that the Minister might be close to the end of his comments. To emphasise the point that my colleagues and I have been making, I remind him of what I said on Second Reading. I shall paraphrase. I tried to show that no individuals in a company are more important to ensuring health and safety in the workplace than directors. They decide the level of investment and the priority given to health and safety, they decide whether the company is subject to proper health and safety audits and they encourage recognition of unsafe practices and their remedies. Other legislation recognises the need to have a range of sanctions and I hope that the Minister will realise that the intent is to identify what we consider to be an anomalous position and a wrong that needs to be put right. I hope that before he sits down he will say something that will comfort us in our belief that we should try to work towards a solution that is acceptable and that is not about vengeance but about a civilised society trying to stop accidents from happening and putting them right when they do.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I do not disagree with my hon. Friends objectives or the Committees. I am trying to point out, supported by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, that the route that my hon. Friends have chosen is not appropriate in the Bill. They could damage what they are trying to achieve on individual liability through the amendments that have been tabled by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton.

Ian Stewart: Which I will not be supporting.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I hope that my hon. Friend will not be supporting them, and I hope that I can convince him not to press his new clause. That is not to say that we do not need to continue to try to find a route to meet the aspirations of my hon. Friends, but that will not be done through the Bill. Of course we believe that employers should take health and safety seriously, and no employer will be able to evade their responsibilities under the Bill. I hope that it will act as a wake up call to those employers who believe that they can flout health and safety, through the provisions on corporate probation, and that it will ensure scope for real improvement in workplace health and safety at work practices.
Individual liability is an issue that many organisations, particularly the trade union movement, have long argued for. Despite any sympathy that I might have had in the past for the arguments represented, that is not a matter that the Government can or are willing to move on in this case. It might be that the issue of board level responsibility for health and safety may need to be considered furtherit is something that I would personally supportas well as the introduction of specific health and safety duties at director level by amending the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. That is the point of the discussions that were going to take place. I shall write to the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton to outline what can be done, and, if he is willing to participateI am sure the Opposition will beI shall use his good offices to see how we can develop those ideas within that framework.
I do believe that there are major problems with the introduction of individual liability in the Bill, for the reasons that I outlined. I hope that my hon. Friends will understand why we do not want to pursue that issue and will explain to senior officials in the trade union movement why it is wrong to attack the Bill for not being relevant or for not being worth the paper it is written on. I hope that the Committee will consider the detail of what has been said and other remedies that would be more appropriate. Clause 17 will help, which is why it should stand part of the Bill. I hope that my hon. Friend recognises the points that have been made and does not press the new clause to a Division.

Roger Gale: The hon. Member for Eccles must understand that, when I call the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton, the debate will be wound up. If he wishes to speak, he needs to do so now.

Ian Stewart: The Minister invited me to provoke him. At the time, I said that I had no intention of so doing, but it is too attractive a proposition to let go. I have been consistent, as have my colleagues. We said that the Bill is a step forward. However, we are not completely convinced that it goes far enough and have tried to put such arguments across during the proceedings. The comments of my hon. Friend about the potential doorways outside the Bill are to be welcomed, although there is no guarantee of that. Trade union leaders and others will come to see that the Bill is a step forward and, on the basis that we are still examining the doorways as described by the Minister and perhaps others, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Roger Gale: Order. New clause 5 has not yet been moved, so it does not need to be withdrawn.

Edward Davey: We have had a good debate. As has often happened during our proceedings, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has shown weaknesses in particular arguments and strengths in others. I will put it no more than that. I shall not press the amendment to a Division, but I hope that we can return to such matters on Report for two major reasons. First, the arguments of the hon. Gentleman and the Minister are that there are already individual liability offences, so we do not need to worry so much. However, as a non-lawyer, it strikes me that sometimes it is useful to have a series of offences that might relate to different degrees of involvement in the causation of an accident. Individual gross negligence manslaughter could be the highest offence, which would inevitably have high levels of proof and be difficult to register, as we have seen in practice. Other offences could be slightly less serious and might be more easy to prove and, thus, require a lower barrier. That is how the criminal law works in many other areas.
There is not only a black-and-white situation in which there is only one offence and a person either commits that offence or is innocent. There are different degrees. Given that the Minister wants to fill the gaps, we must ask ourselves whether there is a gap between individual liability that can be proved at the level of individual gross negligence manslaughter and at the lower end of being a secondary party to a health and safety at work offence. I am not sure. There might be a gap between those two offences that we would fill if we got rid of clause 17. I hope that the Minister will reflect on it. I will certainly do so, as I am sure will other hon. Members. If we do not fill the gap, we might not give individual families that have been bereaved and victims the ability to prosecute when clearly an offence has been committed, albeit not one of serious individual gross negligence manslaughter.
My second point echoes that made by the hon. Member for Eccles. I too welcome the Ministers argument that, if we could improve the regime so that we could strengthen individual responsibility and accountability for health and safety management, it would be a real step forward. This bit of the Bill might not be the place to do it; perhaps such matters are outside the Bill. However, if through pressing and working with the Minister, we can achieve that objective in a different way, that will find consent throughout the House. Ultimately, we are all about trying to prevent accidents in the first place by ensuring that the different laws that come together make the deterrents clear.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I do not make a false promise to the Committee. There were occasions during the passage of the Consumer Credit Bill when the three parties were consensual in their view of how the industry should operate. We had some successful meetings with the industry as a tripartite group. I see us operating similarly in pursuing the Bill, because there is unity on the outcome. It is just how we will get there that is difficult.

Edward Davey: I certainly did not see it as a false promise from the Minister, because he is a Minister of his word. His record as a trade union official and his knowledge of the area have been very helpful in our debates. I am sure that he has been pushing behind the scenes as well as in public to move things forward. I am glad that we have had this debate and that we are beginning to clarify the core issues. Therefore, I do not think that we should divide the Committee at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Power to amend Schedule 1

Question proposed,That the clause stand part ofthe Bill.

Dominic Grieve: I have one query for the Minister. The clause is about the power to amend schedule 1. An amendment that I tabled to the clause was not selected, but we touched on the matter on Second Reading. When I expressed a concern, a Government MemberI cannot now remember whosuggested to me that I was mistaken in my view. I had said that I was a bit concerned about the power to amend schedule 1 under the negative procedure. The point was perfectly well made to me that the negative procedure would apply only in certain circumstances. However, in one circumstance, the power to amend schedule 1 seemed slightly unusual.
Subsection (3) makes provision for certain obvious amendments under the negative procedure, including those
consequential on a department or other body listed in Schedule 1 changing its name.
Nobody can possibly object to that. Paragraph (b) provides:
in the case of an amendment adding a department or other body to Schedule 1, it is consequential on the transfer to the department or other body of functions all of which were previously exercisable by one or more organisations to which section 1 applies.
There is no problem with that either. It is in paragraph (c) that the potential problem lies. It provides for the circumstances if
in the case of an amendment removing a department or other body from Schedule 1, it is consequential on
(i) the abolition of the department or other body, or
(ii) the transfer of all the functions of the department or other body to one or more organisations to which section 1 applies.
Paragraph (c)(ii) presents no difficulty, but the fact that the word or rather than and links sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) implies that if the Government chose to abolish completely a Department or body, any of its responsibilities under the corporate manslaughter provisions could immediately disappear under the negative procedure.
It could be argued that, if the Government decided to abolish, for example, the Department of Trade and Industry, there might be some debate on the subject, and the Departments areas of responsibility might be considered. However, I am slightly concerned that all the Departments responsibilities under the Bill could simply vanish on abolition without transfer, because subsection (3)(c) refers to
the abolition of the department ... or ... the transfer.
I should have expected the link word between subparagraphs (i) and (ii) to be and. If I am wrong about that, the Minister will no doubt put me right. That is why I tabled the amendment. However, it was not selected so I have not had the opportunity to speak to it.

Gerry Sutcliffe: The hon. Gentleman has been persuasive as usual. I am considering what he hasjust said. We touched on this matter in the debate on clause 15 and the relevant amendments. At that point, the hon. Gentleman was suspicious about our choices regarding the affirmative and negative procedures andI was trying to explain the differences relating to administration. I will reflect on what he has said and write to him in due course, expressing our view, because he may be right about the wording.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 20 and 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Extent and territorial application

Ian Stewart: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in clause 23, page 12, line 39, at end insert
(4A) Section 1 also applies if the harm resulting in the death took place outside the United Kingdom, but the conduct set out in section 1(1) of this Act took place within the United Kingdom..
I realise what the Government are attempting to do with the clause, but I have identified a problem with it. The clause applies to harm resulting in death that takes place outside the UK, but I cannot get my head round why we pass legislation applying to UK companies operating here, yet the law does not apply in respect of UK citizens who are employed in the UK but are sent abroad on behalf of a company. A case could be brought under civil law, so I need to know what is the rationale for not providing in the Bill the ability to take action against a corporation. Why should a company that has a duty of care in the UK not be responsible when it sends UK citizens abroad?

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Member for Eccles raises an interesting point. Historically, we have been reluctant to have jurisdiction for actions leading to harm outside our jurisdiction, except in the specific instances statedon ships or offshore facilitiesbecause trying to enforce it carries with it great evidential problems, for example, in finding out why the person died and what went on.
The hon. Gentleman may recollect that, in a previous sitting, I cited the example of the Wylfa nuclear power station[Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield says that I mispronounce it. I have no idea of the correct pronunciationmy knowledge of Welsh is limited. It is confusing, because I have always been told that words in Celtic languages are supposed to be pronounced as they are spelled. However, when I attempt to pronounce the names of the Scottish mountains that I climb, I am always in terrible difficulty.

Ian Stewart: It is pretty straightforward. As a Scot from Salford, I say that killing is killing.

Dominic Grieve: That I understand.
I simply make the following point. I cannot remember whether Dungeness nuclear power stationis still operational or whether it has been decommissioned. Let us suppose, however, that it blew up and a wind blowing strongly from the north-west carried the plume of radioactivity straight over to Boulogne on the other side of the channel, killing its inhabitants. Quite apart from the international repercussions, the incident would raise the interesting point that the entirety of the conduct, which might amount to gross negligence, took place at location A in one state, but the victims were in the neighbouring state. That raises an interesting question of jurisdiction.
It would clearly be desirable for a gross negligence manslaughter prosecution to be brought against the corporation in this country under the corporate manslaughter provisions. In such a limited case, I can see that there could be a problem with the Bill as it stands, but I say to the hon. Member for Eccles that the general rule is sensible. Whenever we have attempted to have extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has usually led to tremendous problems. The hon. Gentleman may recollect that I commented on that issue in a completely different context during debate on the Bill that became the Terrorism Act 2006. There are difficulties with extraterritorial jurisdiction. Soon we shall hear what the Minister has to say on the matter.

Edward Davey: Before that, I should say that I have read briefings that suggestcontrary, for a change, to what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has saidthat it is possible under the current law on manslaughter for an individual to be prosecuted when gross negligence has taken place inside the UK and a death results outside the country.

Dominic Grieve: Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right. I am sorry for not having expressed myself clearly, partly because I used the words gross negligence manslaughter when I intended to refer to corporate manslaughter. I apologise.

Edward Davey: Given that individuals can be prosecuted in such cases, the hon. Member for Eccles is right to raise the question. In such limited cases, why could corporations not be prosecuted? The Government have to explain why they would set up a system in which an individual manager could be charged for gross negligence manslaughter, but the corporation could not.
The Government do not seem to have been consistent. I accept the need to be careful about extraterritorial jurisdiction. The clause would mean that we could not prosecute a company outside the UK if its gross negligence led to a death outside the UK; extending the offence to that situation would probably be a step too far. However, the amendment is not about that. It deals with a company in the UK that was grossly negligent in the UK and a death resulted outside the UK. The hon. Gentleman has made a sound proposition, and the Minister will have to do well to convince me that he is wrong.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I shall continue to try to convince the Committee. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles raises an important question. What should the territorial limits of the offence be? As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, criminal jurisdiction usually applies on a territorial basis, with countries investigating and prosecuting crimes that occur within their borders.
Although it exists, extraterritorial jurisdiction is still very much the exception. There is, for example, extraterritorial jurisdiction for some sex offences, to ensure that British sex tourists can be prosecuted here, and for homicides committed by British subjects. As it stands, the Bill applies if the injury causing death occurs in the United Kingdom or in a range of other places where UK criminal law already applies, including in territorial waters, on British ships and planes and on offshore oil rigs. Apart from deaths that occur on the physical land of the UK, the Bill will therefore extend to cover a range of important circumstances. For example, because it covers death at sea within territorial limits, it would have applied to the Lyme Bay tragedy, when a number of canoeists were killed while at seaindeed, that case led to the first successful prosecution for corporate manslaughter. The new offence would also have applied to the Zeebrugge tragedy. It will apply when death occurs on a British ship or as a result of a tragic accident happening on board a ship that results in people being drowned. It will also apply to fires on oil rigs, such as the Piper Alpha disaster.
During consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny, a number of suggestions were made for applying the offence to deaths that occur overseas. Some have argued that the Bill should apply to British companies operating abroad, by analogy to homicide laws for individualsa point made by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton. Another idea was to apply the offence to deaths in the EU but not more widely. Another was to apply the offence to the deaths of UK employees or employees normally based in the UK but posted abroad. The amendment reflects another of the ideas that have been raised in debate by proposing that the offence be extended to deaths abroad, but only if the management failure has occurred in the UK. The amendment is well intentioned, and I have a good deal of sympathy with what it is designed to achieve, but I am not satisfied that we have yet arrived at a workable solution.
The main reason for criminal jurisdiction operating only within a countrys territory is that that is where its police forces operate. Once we go beyond a countrys borders, the police no longer have jurisdiction and difficulties arise in trying to investigate an offence. There will be difficulties in gathering evidence. Only another countrys police force will be able to collect the evidence, and it will probably be subject to different rulesfor example, few other countries rely on oral evidence as we do.
There is a further potential problem, however, in that we may seem to be exporting our health and safety laws by applying corporate manslaughter laws to overseas activities. Fundamentally, the way a company operates overseas is a matter for the country concerned, and the worry is whether the same regulatory standards apply therean argument that was made during pre-legislative scrutiny. We doubt that the right response to that is to seek to impose our laws on them.
We are not satisfied about extending the new offence to deaths that occur aboard. Even if the management failure in question occurred in the UK, the police would still need to establish why a person had died and that it was caused by the companys management failure. That might not be straightforward, and it still leaves the problem of investigating a death at distance and in another country. If part of a companys operations are run from aboard, it will become difficult to establish that a management failurethe way that the company as a whole managed an activityhad occurred only in this country.
I do not dismiss the important concerns that my hon. Friend has raised, but extending the new offence would be making a significant change in the law and we believe that it is important that we should learn to walk before we run. There may well be a case for looking at jurisdiction further down the line, but we need first to get the offence on the statute book and working. We think that it should extend to deaths that take place in our territory, where the law already applies, before we start raising hopes and expectations about applying it more widely. On that basis, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment.
The hon. Member for Beaconsfield gave the example of the Dungeness power station blowing up. We would be surprised if nobody there was killed in such an incident and if the company was not prosecuted. I hope that the hon. Gentleman accepts my explanation. We accept what my hon. Friend says, but it is not appropriate to move forward at this stage, and I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.

Ian Stewart: My hon. and good Friend was going down a path that made me feel very ill at ease, although I understand why he takes that line. The saving grace was his final comments, which were designed to make me feel more comfortable about withdrawing the amendment. We will return to the subjectand with renewed vigour, as I am increasingly concernedabout it.
I know that the Minister is concerned about siren voices from outside the House, but they will always be there. I have said that the Bill is a step forward. If the Minister is prepared to revisit this and the other clauses that the Committee has discussed, we can make it a significant step forward. That will not in itself result in a situation that I find satisfactory, so I am pleased that he has offered all Committee members the opportunity to examine any doors though which we can go collectively. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

Gerry Sutcliffe: I extend my thanks to you, Mr. Gale, and to Mr. Benton, for the excellent way in which you have chaired our proceedings. I hope that you have found us tolerably well behaved.
We have tried to reach a consensus and to scrutinise the detail of the Billa necessary process. I thank the hon. Members for Beaconsfield, for Kingston and Surbiton, and for East Dunbartonshire and all Committee members for the way in which they have dealt with the substantive matters that we have discussed. I give particular thanks to my hon. Friends on the Government Benches. Labour Members have been attached to the Bill for a number of years and I am pleased that my hon. Friends have had an opportunity to debate its provisions.
I am also pleased that the press has commendedus on our mature debate. There was a sketch inThe Independent that said that we were a progressive Committee and that we were prepared to look at possible ways forward. There have been some thought-provoking discussions. I shall genuinely consider many of the things that have been said and examine what can be done to improve the Bill.
I value the expert, freely given legal advice of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, given his experience over the years. I am also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Campbell), who has kept the Committee in good order by working with the Opposition Whips to ensure that we scrutinised the Bill properly within a reasonable time. I thank the Committee Clerks, the Hansard reporters, the police and the Bill team for their work. I hope that the Committee feels that we are making progress.

Dominic Grieve: I join the Minister in extending thanks to you, Mr. Gale, and to Mr. Benton for chairing the Committee. It is extremely cheering to learn that a journalist paid any attention to what goes on in a Standing Committee. I long ago concluded that one of the great problems of Standing Committee work is that if one starts to show any sign of enjoying it, one is consigned to being considered a political anorak, because on the whole it requires quite a bit of work if it is to be done properly, and one gets virtually zero coverage for what one does. That is a pity, because this Committee has been a classic example of a sensible co-operation between all parties to explore whether we can improve legislation.
There have not been amendments other than Government ones, but there is certainly room for further inquiry so that on Report we can continue in the spirit in which we started and consider whether the Bill can be improved in one or two respects. I am particularly conscious of what the hon. Member for Eccles has been trying to do alongside the hon. Member for Manchester, Centralthere was a lot in what he said that seemed to me to have merit and to deserve further consideration. If there are ways in which we can make progress I would be perfectly happy to support sensible amendments, particularly in the area of probation for corporations.
I extend my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield, who has acted as our Whip, and to all my hon. Friendsparticularly my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch who stood in for me on the day when I could not attend. Finally, I thank all Committee members for having made it a particularly enjoyable and rewarding activity.

Edward Davey: I shall make my Oscar ceremony speech as short as possible. I join in all the thanks, and I am pleased with the way in which the Minister has performed his duties, because he has listened and he has made a few promises. We shall look at Hansard and await the delivery of those promises, but I am confident that they will be delivered. I conclude by saying that I am glad that we do not have to pay any bills to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, given the services that we have received from him.

Roger Gale: The Committee has been hopelessly out of order for the past five minutes. That seems to happen sometimes in Bills under my chairmanshipI cannot think why.
However, as we are completely out of order, I add my thanks to the officers and staff of the House, without whom our work would be well nigh impossible. Let me also say on behalf of Mr. Benton and myself that we have regarded the conduct of this Committee as absolutely exemplary. It has been conducted with good humour and great courtesy and productivity. I only wish that more people outside this place were aware of the kind of work that is done. I give my personal thanks to all members of the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at ten minutes to One oclock.